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I. INTRODUCTION
How do we value ten hours of legal work 1 performed by a discharged
attorney who significantly contributes 2 to a twenty-million-dollar
settlement? 3 In Faricy v. API Trust, the Minnesota Supreme Court
provided eight factors that district courts should use to determine the
quantum meruit value of services provided by an attorney under a
contingent fee agreement when the attorney is discharged before the
contingency occurs. 4 Two of the eight factors address concerns specific to
the context of a discharged contingent fee attorney, which was an issue of
first impression for the court. 5
This case note begins by exploring the factors and approaches that
were historically considered to determine the quantum meruit value of legal
work and the compensation of attorneys. 6 A discussion of the facts,
procedural history, and holdings of Faricy v. API Trust follows. 7 Next, the
case note argues the likely limitations of the eight-factor test when applied
to future cases and provides potential solutions for avoiding fee disputes in
situations similar to Faricy v. API Trust. 8 Finally, this note concludes that
inconsistencies may remain in future district court decisions because the
weight that applies to each of the factors in the eight-factor test is unclear. 9

JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Gregory
M. Duhl for insightful guidance and the Mitchell Hamline Law Review staff for feedback.
Oral Argument of Faricy Law Firm, P.A. at 10:42, Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc.
Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 2018) (A16-1539),
http://www.mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt/OralArgumentWebcasts/ArgumentDetail.aspx?vi
d=1178 [https://perma.cc/8RRQ-FSQW] (“[U]nder ten, maybe under five.”).
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Trust, 912 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn.
2018) (“The district court found that ‘the events leading to the settlement between API Trust
and the Home Liquidator lead to the reasonable inference that Faricy’s work product, advice,
and recommended negotiation strategy led to the settlement in significant part.’” (emphasis
omitted)).
Id. at 655 (“API Trust settled the Home Liquidator claim for $21.5 million.”).
Id. at 658.
See id.; see also Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., No. A16-1539,
2017 WL 1832415, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017), aff’d as modified, 912 N.W.2d 652
(Minn. 2018). Previous decisions concerning multiple law firms were from cases at the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of Am., 524 N.W.2d
500, 504 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); In re L-tryptophan Cases, 518 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V. After the Minnesota Supreme Court’s remand of Faricy in 2018, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in December 2019, issued its decision on remand, awarding
Faricy a fee of $84,000. Faricy Law Firm, PA v. API, Inc., No. A19-0846, 2019 WL 6461323
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2019).
*
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II. HISTORY

A. History of Attorney’s Fees
It is the “American Rule” that each party in a lawsuit bears its own
attorney’s fees unless there is an express statutory authorization providing
otherwise. 10 Courts have upheld and enforced fee contracts between
attorneys and clients since the nineteenth century. 11 When there were
statutory limitations on attorney’s fees, courts allowed attorneys to recover
in quantum meruit, 12 implying that there was some standard when assessing
fees. 13 Once the freedom to contract between attorneys and clients was
acknowledged, courts had little ground for rejecting contingent fee contracts
and allowed fee arrangements to enable those who could not pay large fees
in advance to access the courts. 14 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
courts had become more receptive to contingent fee contracts, and such
contracts were well established in practice. 15 Contingent fee contracts
between attorneys and clients are widely adopted based on their merits for
client protection. 16

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); Fownes v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 310
Minn. 540, 542, 246 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1976) (“The general American rule is that attorneys
fees may not be awarded to a successful litigant without explicit statutory or contractual
authorization.”). Examples of Minnesota statutes authorizing an award of attorney fees
include denial of insurance coverage without reasonable basis, MINN. STAT. § 604.18,
subdiv. 3 (2019), action against a creditor who used a misleading form, MINN. STAT. §
571.72, subdiv. 7 (2019), and action for physical interference with safe access to health care,
MINN. STAT. § 609.7495, subdiv. 4 (2019). See generally MARY MULLEN, MINN. HOUSE
RESEARCH DEP’T, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN MINNESOTA STATUTES (2018),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TYV-9TXM].
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 16 (1984) (citing Bayard v. McLane, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 139, 217–
22 (1840); Stevens & Cagger v. Adams, 23 Wend. 57 (N.Y. 1840), aff’d, 26 Wend. 451 (N.Y.
1841)). There were legislative limits on what attorneys could charge their clients, and higher
fees were charged after the statutes were repealed or forgotten by the late eighteenth century.
Id. at 13. Courts and attorneys were more interested in establishing the attorney’s right to
collect larger fees from the attorney’s client rather than justifying or criticizing a system which
awarded the prevailing party a small attorney fee. Id. at 14.
Quantum meruit is Latin for “as much as he has deserved.” Quantum meruit, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Leubsdorf, supra note 11, at 16 (citing Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts 334 (Pa. 1835); Newnan v.
Washington, 8 Tenn. 86 (1 Mart. & Yer. 79) (1827); Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vt. 419 (1849)).
10

11

12

13

Id.
Id.
See Kenneth A. Ewing, Quantum Meruit in Ohio: The Search for a Fair Standard In
Contingent Fee Contracts, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110–12 (1992) (citing numerous state
14
15
16

cases recognizing contingent fee contracts; discussing fields applying contingent fee contracts,
integrated functions of contingency fee contracts, merits and benefits offered by contingent
fee contracts, and types of contingency fee contracts).
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Since 1927, Minnesota has allowed parties to freely enter into
agreements with attorneys without restricting the type of fee agreement
which may be used. 17 The Minnesota Supreme Court has also long
recognized that contracts for contingent fees benefit the client as well as the
attorney. 18
A contingent fee is a fee payable to the attorney only when the case is
successful. 19 In a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer agrees to accept a
fixed percentage of the amount recovered, with the fee coming out of the
money awarded to the client. 20 While there is a chance that, under a
contingent arrangement, there will be no payment for the attorney, there is
also a chance of obtaining a higher payment than that under an hourly fee
arrangement, especially when the client’s recovery is large. 21 As in Faricy v.
API Trust, the potential compensation in question can become significant
under a contingent fee contract. 22

B. Quantum Meruit
In a contingent fee contract, the client can discharge the attorney
without cause before the contingency occurs because the right to terminate
is an implied term of the contract. 23 When an attorney is discharged from a
contingent fee contract before the contingency is reached, the discharged
attorney may not sue for breach of contract damages because of the client’s

MINN. STAT. § 9470 (1927) (“A party shall have an unrestricted right to agree with his
attorney as to his compensation for services, and the measure and mode thereof . . . .”). The
text in the current statute remains unchanged except for gender neutrality. See MINN. STAT.
§ 549.01 (2019).
Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 276–77, 271 N.W. 493, 497 (1937) (quoting 2 R.C.L. §
121, pp.1039–40) (“Contracts for contingent fees are as much for the benefit of the client as
for the attorney, because if the client has a meritorious cause of action, but no means with
which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of the law, make a contract
for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation, he cannot obtain the
services of a law-abiding attorney, and if perchance he should find one who would secretly
make with him a contract in violation of the law, he might put himself in unsafe hands.”).
How Do I Settle on a Fee with a Lawyer? AM. BAR ASS’N (June 7, 2018), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/public-information/how-do-i-settle-ona-fee-with-a-lawyer-/ [https://perma.cc/8ANU-5A8B].
17

18

19

Id.
Id.
Id. (“In a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer agrees to accept a fixed percentage (often
one-third to forty percent) of the amount recovered.”). In Faricy v. API Trust, the potential
20
21
22

claim could have reached $50 million. Appellant Faricy Law Firm, P.A.’s Principle Brief at
13, Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 2017 WL 1832415 (Minn.
Ct. App. May 8, 2017) (No. A16-1539), 2016 WL 10906501, at *13 (“Proof of claim
mentions that ‘API estimates that the total value of such claims asserted in the Proof of Claim
exceed $50,000,000.’”) [hereinafter Faricy’s Brief].
In re Petition for Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees, 870 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. 2015).
23
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implied right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. 24 This same rule
prevents a contingent fee attorney from recovering the contingent fee under
the terms of the contract if the contingency occurs after the client terminates
the attorney’s representation. 25 The discharged attorney is instead entitled to
compensation for the reasonable value of the services under the equitable
theory of quantum meruit. 26
Quantum meruit may apply in two different circumstances: as a claim
at law for the fair market value of a party’s performance under an impliedin-fact contract, or as a claim in equity for restitution of the value of a benefit
conferred in the absence of a contract under a theory of unjust enrichment. 27
Quantum meruit, as discussed in Faricy v. API Trust, was a claim in equity, 28
and the calculation of the reasonable value of services was distinct from the
hourly calculation used in non-equitable contexts. 29 To prove a claim in
quantum meruit, one element the discharged attorney must prove is the
value of the services provided. 30 Multiple factors have been used to
determine this value. 31

C. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees under Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the American Bar
Association (ABA) Canons of Professional Ethics in 1955 and the ABA
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Trust, 912 N.W.2d 652, 657
(Minn. 2018) (citing In re Petition for Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees Between Stowman Law
Firm, P.A., 870 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. 2015)); see also Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281,
284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“If the client has this right as an implied condition of the
contract under the law, it follows as a natural consequence that he cannot be compelled to
pay damages for exercising that right which his contract gives him.”).
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 657 (quoting Stowman, 870 N.W.2d at 761) (“We have applied the
Lawler quantum meruit rule to a contingent-fee agreement.”).
See id. (quoting Stowman, 870 N.W.2d at 761) (“[W]hile a court will not penalize a client
for an exercise of the right to terminate a representation agreement and settle a matter
without the attorney’s consultation or consent, when the client does so the measure of relief
of the attorney is the reasonable value of his services.”); Lawler, 145 Minn. at 285, 176 N.W.
at 990 (adopting the quantum meruit rule established in Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48
(N.Y. App. Div. 1916), for the compensation of discharged attorneys) (“The rule secures to
the attorney the right to recover the reasonable value of the services which he has rendered,
and is well calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable
profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential.”).
Stowman, 870 N.W.2d at 759 n.2.
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658 (citing Stowman, 870 N.W.2d at 759 n.2).
Id. (citing MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119; Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520,
542 (Minn. 1986)).
See id. (quoting High v. Supreme Lodge of World, 210 Minn. 471, 473–74, 298 N.W.
723, 725 (1941)) (“To prove a claim in quantum meruit, the discharged attorney must prove
‘(1) that the services were rendered; (2) under circumstances from which a promise to pay
for them should be implied; and (3) their value.’”).
See infra Sections II.B.–D.
24

25

26

27
28
29

30

31
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Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970. “The Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct were patterned after the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and were formally adopted in 1985 to replace the
32

Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility.” 33 To determine the
reasonableness of a fee, Rule 1.5(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct considers:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 34
The factors specified are not exhaustive and not all factors may be
relevant in each case. 35 Since the adoption of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1970, there have been minimal changes to these factors to
assess the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. 36

D. The Lodestar Approach
The lodestar approach, described in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 37
determines the attorney’s reasonable fee by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 38
While other considerations may adjust the fee upward or downward, the
lodestar approach considers the results obtained by the attorney as an
important factor. 39 In some cases of exceptional success, an enhanced award
may be justified. 40 There is no precise rule or formula for making these
adjustments, 41 and the party seeking an award of fees should submit
See Edward J. Cleary & William J. Wernz, Ethics and Enforcement, 25 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 143, 146, 151 (1999).
State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 463 n.5 (Minn. 1999) (citing Petition of Weiblen, 439
N.W.2d 7, 9 n.2 (Minn. 1989)).
MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a) (2019).
Id. r. 1.5(a) cmt. 1.
Compare id. r. 1.5(a), with CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1970).
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435. The ratio of this enhanced award to the lodestar value is called an enhancement
or multiplier. See Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 624 (Minn. 2008).
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.
32

33

34
35
36

37
38
39
40

41
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evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed 42 using prevailing
market rates in the relevant community. 43 Where the documentation of
hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award. 44
Upward adjustments to the lodestar method are justified in rare cases
when specific evidence shows there was exceptional success. 45 Risk involved
in the litigation may also allow an upward adjustment. 46 When multipliers
are used to adjust the attorney’s fee upward, states that allow the practice
typically limit the multipliers to the single digits. 47 Through Specialized
Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 48 Minnesota adopted the lodestar approach described
by the United States Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart. 49

E. Factors Considered in Minnesota Cases
Minnesota cases present a comprehensive list of factors that courts
have used to evaluate attorney’s fees. Notably, Kittler & Hedelson v.
Sheehan Properties, Inc. listed twelve factors that Minnesota courts have
considered:
(1) The time and labor required; (2) the responsibility assumed;
(3) the magnitude of the principal amount; (4) the results
obtained; (5) the fees customarily charged for similar services; (6)
the experience, character, reputation, and ability of counsel; (7)
the fee arrangements; (8) the circumstances under which the
services were rendered; (9) the nature and difficulty of the
proposition involved; (10) the doubtful solvency of the client and
the apparent difficulties of collection; (11) the anticipation of
future services; and (12) the preclusion of other employment. 50

42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 433.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Blum, 465 U.S. at 899.
See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561 (1992).
Matthew D. Klaiber, A Uniform Fee-Setting System for Calculating Court-Awarded

Attorneys’ Fees: Combining Ex Ante Rates with a Multifactor Lodestar Method and a
Performance-Based Mathematical Model, 66 MD. L. REV. 228, 244–45, 250 (2007)
(providing multipliers calculated from cases employing the lodestar method).
392 N.W.2d 520, 542 (Minn. 1986).
See Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 658
(Minn. 2018) (explaining the adoption of the lodestar method by Specialized Tours, Inc. v.
Hagen).
Kittler & Hedelson v. Sheehan Properties, Inc., 295 Minn. 232, 236–37, 203 N.W.2d 835,
839 (1973) (citing O’Donnell v. McGee Trucks, Inc., 294 Minn. 110, 199 N.W.2d 432
(1972); State by Head v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 188 N.W.2d 424 (1971); In re Atwood’s
Tr., 227 Minn. 495, 497, 35 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1949)). Kittler has one of the most
comprehensive sets of criteria, likely due to its reliance on State by Head v. Paulson, 290
Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W. 2d 424, 426 (1971), which cites the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
48
49

50
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Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of America affirmed additional
factors that the district court used—proportion of funds invested by each
firm and the result of each firm’s efforts—to determine the distribution of
fees to two law firms retained under contingency fee contracts for the same
client. 51
F. Factors Considered in Federal and Non-Minnesota Jurisdictions
Many federal district courts 52 and some state courts 53 consider the
Johnson factors 54 when adjusting the lodestar amount. There are twelve
Johnson factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 55
The Andersen factors, 56 comparable to the Johnson factors, 57 are also
used in multiple jurisdictions 58 to determine the reasonableness of a fee. The
Andersen factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal
service properly; (2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of Am., 524 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
See, e.g., Perry v. Isle of Wight Cty., 311 F. Supp. 3d 751, 756 (E.D. Va. 2018); Chambers
v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F. Supp. 3d 877, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (calling the factors “Kerr
factors” based on Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), which
adopted the Johnson factors); Carpaneda v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 3d 219, 230
(D. Mass. 2015); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 112 F. Supp. 3d 31, 48 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
See, e.g., Metcoff v. NCT Group, Inc., 50 A.3d 1004, 1013 (Conn. 2011); Spooner v.
Town of Topsham, 9 A.3d 672, 675 (Vt. 2010); Hollen v. Hathaway Elec., Inc., 584 S.E.2d
523, 529 (W. Va. 2003).
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated
on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
51
52

53

54

55

Id.

Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 205 F.3d 222, 232 (5th Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., Ross-Williams v. Bennett, 419 P.3d 608, 632 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (citing KAN.
R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a) (2018)); Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Williamson, 597 So. 2d 439,
442 (La. 1992) (citations omitted).
56
57
58
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circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or
uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been
rendered. 59
While there are variations, many states consider similar points when
evaluating the adjustments to the lodestar calculation or assessing the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fee. Some states apply the factors
differently, with many leaving the factors potentially open-ended. New York
courts consider “various factors” to determine the reasonable value of the
services rendered when a discharged attorney seeks to recover fees in
quantum meruit. 60 Rather than listing factors, other courts may consider the
“totality of circumstances” 61 or “all relevant factors,” 62 based on deference
for the trial court’s discretion. 63

G. Compensation for Multiple Law Firms
In the New Jersey case of La Mantia v. Durst, a contingent fee had to
be divided between an attorney’s new and former law firms after the attorney
left the former firm, taking the client with him to the new firm. 64 To
reasonably allocate the fees, the court in La Mantia considered: (1) the
length of time each firm spent on the case; (2) the proportion of funds
invested by each firm; (3) the quality of representation; (4) the result of each
firm’s efforts; (5) the reason the client changed firms; (6) the viability of the
claim at transfer; (7) the amount of recovery realized; and (8) any pre-

59

Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.04).

Dweck Law Firm, L.L.P. v. Mann, No. 03 Civ. 8967(SAS), 2004 WL 1794486, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2004) (citing Ingber v. Sabato, 229 A.D.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1996)) (noting
a less exhaustive list of factors, including “the difficulty of the matter, the nature and extent
of the services rendered, the time reasonably expended on those services, the quality of
performance by counsel, the qualifications of counsel, the amount at issue, and the results
obtained (to the extent known)” (internal citation omitted)).
See Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982) (“In computing the reasonable
value of the discharged attorney’s services, the trial court can consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the professional relationship between the attorney and client.”).
See, e.g., Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co., 649 P.2d 376, 379 (Haw. 1982); Roberds v.
Sweitzer, 733 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. 1987); Weatherford v. Price, 532 S.E.2d 310, 316 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2000).
See Goldstein & Price, L.C. v. Tonkin & Mondl, L.C., 974 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (citing Roberds, 733 S.W.2d at 447) (“[T]he trial court sits as an expert in
consideration of attorney fees due after consideration of all relevant factors.”). The trial
court’s discretion is respected “unless the award is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it
indicates indifference and lack of proper judicial consideration.” Id. (citing Estate of Strauss
v. Schaeffer, 781 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
La Mantia v. Durst, 561 A.2d 275, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
60

61

62

63

64
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existing partnership agreements. 65 Even jurisdictions outside of New Jersey
rely on La Mantia when cases involve splitting fees between multiple law
firms based on a contingency agreement. 66
III. THE FARICY V. API TRUST DECISION

A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In Faricy v. API Trust, respondent API, Inc., (API) Asbestos
Settlement Trust (API Trust) was the trust established for the benefit of
claimants on asbestos-related claims under API’s plan of reorganization
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 67 API Trust retained appellant, Faricy Law
Firm, P.A. (Faricy), under a fee agreement with no hourly fee and a onethird contingent fee. 68
From January 2009 to August 2012, Faricy represented API Trust on
an insurance claim against Home Liquidator. 69 Attorneys from Faricy
drafted letters, conducted legal research, and advised and strategized with
API Trust on settlement negotiations with Home Liquidator. 70 In June
2012, while Faricy was still representing API Trust, Home Liquidator
extended an $11 million settlement offer. 71 On August 31, 2012, API Trust
terminated Faricy’s representation. 72 In late September 2012, Faricy
requested a third of the settlement recovery API Trust was supposed to—
but did not—receive from Home Liquidator. 73 In November 2012, API
Trust settled the Home Liquidator claim for $21.5 million. 74 Faricy again
requested one-third of the settlement payments, based on the contingent fee
agreement. 75 API Trust refused to pay Faricy any amount that reflected the
contingent fee. 76 Faricy filed an attorney’s lien under section 481.13 of the
Minnesota Statutes, asserting entitlement to one-third of all received and

65
66

Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Skepnek v. Roper & Twardowsky, LLC, No. 11-04102-DDC, 2017 WL 3970778,

at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2017); Kopelman & Assocs., L.C. v. Collins, 473 S.E.2d 910, 919
(W. Va. 1996).
In re A.P.I., Inc., 537 B.R. 902, 904 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015).
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Minn.
2018).
67
68

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pending payments from Home Liquidator to API Trust. 77 Faricy then
sought to enforce the lien. 78
The district court considered whether Faricy had proven a claim in
quantum meruit. 79 To determine the quantum meruit value of Faricy’s
services, the district court attempted to use two different methods of
calculation: the lodestar method and a factor-based method developed by
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 80 The district court found that Faricy
worked together with API Trust and that Faricy’s work significantly led to
the excellent outcome. 81 However, the district court awarded Faricy no
compensation for its work because Faricy failed to prove the reasonable
value of its work regardless of the calculation or approach. 82
On appeal, the court of appeals developed a six-factor test, based on
Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of America, Inc., 83 for calculating the
quantum meruit value of a discharged attorney’s services under contingent
fee arrangements. 84 The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case to the district court to engage in a quantum
meruit analysis by applying the six factors, 85 none of which considered the
contingent fee agreement. 86 After this decision by the court of appeals, Faricy
appealed, and API Trust cross-appealed. 87

B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review on two issues: (1)
“whether the contingent fee agreement can be considered as a factor when
determining the reasonable value of services in quantum meruit,” and (2)
“the amount of evidence required to prove quantum meruit.” 88 For the first
issue, the majority explained that the contingent fee arrangement is only one
factor among many when considering an award for quantum meruit. 89 In its
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

524 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., No. A16-1539, 2017 WL
1832415, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017), aff’d as modified, 912 N.W.2d 652 (Minn.
2018). The factors developed by the court of appeals are: (1) the length and amount of time
spent on the case; (2) the quality and level of expertise; (3) results obtained by the attorney’s
efforts; (4) contribution of others; (5) risks undertaking in accepting employment on the case;
and (6) the relevant circumstances surrounding the discharge. Id.
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 657.
Id. at 658 (citing Faricy, 2017 WL 1832415, at *4).
Id. at 654.
83
84

85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 658.
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ruling, the court provided eight factors that district courts should use to
determine the quantum meruit value of a discharged contingent fee
attorney’s services:
(1) time and labor required; (2) nature and difficulty of the
responsibility assumed; (3) amount involved and the results
obtained; (4) fees customarily charged for similar legal services;
(5) experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; (6) fee
arrangement existing between counsel and the client; (7)
contributions of others; and (8) timing of the termination. 90
The lodestar method considers the first six factors to evaluate the
reasonableness of statutory attorney fees. 91 On the other hand, Faricy
applied the same six factors to establish the fee award in the specific context
of assessing the reasonable quantum meruit value of legal services provided
by a discharged contingent fee attorney. 92 The last two factors “allow the
courts to measure the value of the services depending on how the timing of
the termination related to the ultimate result and whether the discharged
attorney added value compared to other contributors to the case.” 93 The
court believed the set of factors adopted “should guide district courts faced
with the task of balancing the equities in determining the quantum meruit
value of the services of a discharged contingent fee attorney.” 94
The court remanded the case, directing the district court to determine
the fee by considering, among other factors, the contingent fee arrangement
between Faricy and API Trust under the new eight-factor test. 95 The court
noted that the fee agreement “is merely one factor, among a host of others
that the district court is to consider in awarding reasonable attorney fees.” 96
Because of the remand, the majority did not decide on the second issue of
evidence required to prove quantum meruit. 97 The dissenting opinion
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion because Faricy had not provided
proof of reasonable value of services during the proceedings, concluding
that Faricy’s motion for fees should be denied. 98

90
91
92

Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. (citing City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 298 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 1980); State by

Head v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1971)).
Id. at 660.
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 826 N.W.2d 530, 536 (Minn. 2013)).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Direct Implication of the Faricy v. API Trust Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted an eight-factor test that
addresses the complexity of determining the reasonable value of services
when multiple parties are involved in one case. 99 Prior to the decision in
Faricy, cases involving multiple parties with contingency agreements could
rely on Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of America, 100 which based its
factors on In re L-tryptophan Cases. 101 However, the holding in Ltryptophan was not intended to apply to cases in which a discharged attorney
sues the client. 102 Further, to determine the factors for awarding attorney’s
fees, L-tryptophan relied on a case outside the jurisdiction. 103 However, even
with the eight-factor test from Faricy 104 and numerous other factors which
could be considered, 105 district courts will likely continue facing difficulties
when determining the value of and reasonable compensation for a
contingent-fee attorneys’ legal work for two reasons.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court requires the district courts to
weigh and balance the equities between the parties, 106 without further

99
100

Id. at 661 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., Kohn v. City of Minneapolis Fire Dep’t, No. C4-00-1625, 2001 WL 138757, at

*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2001) (citing Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of Am., 524
N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
In Ashford, the Minnesota Court of Appeals compared the district court’s factors to the
six factors used in L-tryptophan and affirmed the district court’s decision. Ashford, 524
N.W.2d at 503–04 (citing In re L-tryptophan Cases, 518 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994)).
L-tryptophan, 518 N.W.2d at 621 (“We emphasize that our holding does not apply to cases
in which a discharged attorney sues a client, or to cases in which a client wants to discharge
an attorney, with or without cause.”).
Id. (relying on La Mantia v. Durst, 561 A.2d 275, 279 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)).
While L-tryptophan also considered factors from Kittler v. Sheehan Properties, Inc., 295
Minn. 232, 236–37, 203 N.W.2d 835, 839 (1973), all the factors described in La Mantia
differ from the factors listed in Kittler to different degrees.
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 661 (Minn.
2018).
See Kittler, 295 Minn. at 236, 203 N.W.2d at 839 (noting other factors the court has
considered, such as, the magnitude of the principal amount, the circumstances under which
services were rendered, the nature and difficulty of the proposition involved, the doubtful
solvency of the client and the apparent difficulties of collection, the anticipation of future
services, and the preclusion of other employment).
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 660 (quoting RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde, 820 N.W.2d 1, 13
(Minn. 2012)) (“[B]right-line rules of any kind are in conflict with the basic principles of
equity, which by definition require a court to weigh and balance the equities between the
parties.”).
101

102

103

104

105

106
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guidance on how to assign weight to each of the eight factors. 107 The court
explained its decision by offering examples, including a situation where the
client discharges the attorney moments before settlement occurs. 108 If the
weight placed on “time and labor required” or “amount involved and the
results obtained” is unclear when establishing the fee, the district courts will
likely continue to experience difficulty when deciding cases. 109 This is
especially true where minimal time and effort expended leads to an
excellent outcome or maximal time and effort expended leads to a poor
outcome.
Second, the reasonable value of attorney’s fees is a question of fact, 110
and district courts will use the eight-factor test to determine the reasonable
value of services provided by a discharged contingent fee attorney in
quantum meruit. 111 However, the possible range of courts’ decisions could
be problematic in practice. For example, in the dispute between the
appellant and respondent in Faricy, the possible reasonable value of service
ranged from $41,000 112 to about $7 million 113 for five to ten hours of work.
This range translates to $4,100 to $1.4 million per hour of work. 114
Regardless of the outcome achieved, the time and labor expended and the
fees customarily charged for similar legal services are factors that must be
weighed in computing the value of service. 115 Accordingly, it may be difficult
to arrive even at the lowest end ($4,100 per hour) of this range when $465
is the highest hourly rate referenced in the court documents for Faricy. 116
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have improved its eight-factor
test in Faricy by assigning more weight to results obtained to determine the
Id. at 661 (“The calculation of a quantum meruit award is instead an equitable process by
which the court determines the reasonable value of services based on a variety of factors,
which, ultimately, produces an equitable remedy.”).
Id. at 660.
See id. at 658.
Id. at 657 (citing Thomas A. Foster & Assocs. v. Paulson, 699 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005)).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 656 n.2 (“The district court also recognized that the record supported a conclusion
that the trustee did most of the work and thus that the reasonable value of Faricy’s work is
something less than $41,000.”).
Id. at 655 (“API Trust settled the Home Liquidator claim for $21.5 million. . . . Faricy
again wrote to API Trust and requested 1/3 of the payments.”).
The lowest value is calculated by dividing the lower value by the longer hours ($41,000/10
= $4,100); the highest value is calculated by dividing the higher value by the shorter hours
($21,000,000/5 = $1,400,000).
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658. These are the first, third, and fourth factors of the eight-factor
test.
Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at *6 (“API initially retained Faricy on an hourly fee
agreement providing that John H. Faricy, Jr. and Craig Roen charged $465 per hour while
associates charged between $200 and $365 per hour.”). API, the predecessor of API Trust,
and the Faricy Law Firm had an hourly-fee agreement before the contingency-fee agreement.
See Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 655–56.
107

108
109
110

111
112

113

114

115

116
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quantum meruit value of the attorney’s services when the attorney is
discharged without cause from the contingency fee contract. While Faricy
provides a valuable framework for calculating the quantum meruit value of
an attorney’s services, without further specification of the weight to be
assigned to each of Faricy’s eight factors, the Faricy test may have limited
impact. Without guidance on how to weigh the Faricy factors, courts may
assign different weights to each factor and arrive at different quantum meruit
values even when the facts are the same across cases. An approach that
assigns additional weight to the results obtained would have still maintained
consistency with the lodestar approach because the lodestar approach treats
results obtained by the attorney as an important factor. 117
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that public policy requires
freedom of contract to remain inviolate except in cases where the “contract
violates some principle which is of even greater importance to the general
public.” 118 Further, contingent fee contracts are valid contracts 119 and “a large
fee is not necessarily an unreasonable fee.” 120 Since the reasonable value of
attorney’s fees is a question of fact, and the findings of the trial court must
be upheld by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous, 121 it will be
important for an attorney to be able to justify the fee with specific evidence.
Therefore, further analysis of the eight factors from Faricy is required and
valuable to avoid similar uncertainties concerning fee disputes.

B. Avoiding Fee Disputes When Results Are Exceptional
There has been an interest in the Faricy factors and their impact on
contingency fee contracts. 122 Given the uncertainty with how trial courts will
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also Carmen Enters., Inc. v.
Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 389 (Pa. 2018) (“The facts and factors to be taken into
consideration in determining the fee or compensation payable to an attorney include: . . .
and, very importantly, the amount of money or the value of the property in question.”).
Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976) (citing James
Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 98 Minn. 22, 23, 107 N.W. 742,
742 (1906)).
Holt v. Swenson, 252 Minn. 510, 514, 90 N.W.2d 724, 727–28 (1958) (quoting Hollister
v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 276, 271 N.W. 493, 497 (1937)).
Kittler & Hedelson v. Sheehan Props., Inc., 295 Minn. 232, 236, 203 N.W.2d 835, 839
(1973) (citing Obraske v. Woody, 295 Minn. 105, 109, 199 N.W. 2d 429, 432 (1972)).
Amerman v. Lakeland Dev. Corp., 295 Minn. 536, 537, 203 N.W.2d 400, 400–01 (1973).
See Kevin P. Hickey & Aram V. Desteian, Developments in Legal Malpractice and
117

118

119

120

121
122

Professional Responsibility That Affect Litigators, 2018 Civil Litigator’s Annual Short
Course,
MINN.
CONTINUING
LEGAL
EDUC.
(Feb.
6,
2018),
https://www.minncle.org/eAccess/2021281801/105_Hickey_PPT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32ZE-PZ3J] (discussing Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos
Settlement Tr., No. A16-1539, 2017 WL 1832415 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017)); Barbara
L. Jones, A Blow to the Contingent Fee?, MINN. LAW. (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://minnlawyer.com/2018/01/17/a-blow-to-the-contingent-fee/ [https://perma.cc/K6BFFM22]; Barbara L. Jones, Supreme Court Sets Fee Award Factors, MINN. LAW. (June 11,
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apply the eight factors, the following analysis intends to set forth some
considerations for both clients and attorneys when entering a contingency
fee agreement to avoid fee litigation after termination of contingency fee
contracts.

1. Client’s Perspective
For a client to avoid a fee dispute after discharging a contingent
attorney, it may be necessary to begin with an hour-based fee consultation.
The client should seek to understand the potential amount of work before
entering a contingent fee contract. 123 This enables the client to assess whether
an hourly fee contract or a contingent fee contract would yield a higher net
recovery after paying attorney’s fees. While a contingent fee arrangement
allows a client without much money to access the legal system, 124 it may be
financially prudent for the client to explore alternate methods to finance the
litigation if there is potential for disagreement over the fees based on
prospective recovery and work provided by the attorney.

2. Attorney’s Perspective
As long as courts must consider the time and labor required 125 as
factors, it seems extremely unlikely that the full contingency amount will be
awarded to an attorney who has the skill and experience to obtain a
spectacular result with minimal effort but is discharged from a contingent
fee contract immediately before the contingency is met. While the
remaining seven factors provided in Faricy could affect the award, the
baseline used for the calculation of the fee still appears to be the time and
labor required if the lodestar method is used. 126 It is unlikely that the
remaining seven factors will significantly change the fee calculation because
they would likely be considered “adjustments.” 127 Taking Faricy as an
2018),
https://minnlawyer.com/2018/06/11/supreme-court-sets-fee-award-factors/
[https://perma.cc/S5UB-Y7XW].
Hiring an Attorney, OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATT’Y GEN. 1, https://www.ag.state.mn.us/
Brochures/pubHiringAnAttorney.pdf [https://perma.cc/854W-8XJY] (last visited Feb. 2,
2020) (“Because the hours worked on your case can quickly add up, you should ask for an
estimate of the number of hours necessary to complete your case.”).
Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 271, 271 N.W. 493, 497 (1937).
This is the first factor in Faricy and other cases. See Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc.
Asbestos Settlement Trust, 912 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. 2018); see also Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp.,
945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for
determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”).
Id. at 434 (“There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust
the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the ‘results obtained.’”).
123

124
125

126

127
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example, it is also highly unlikely that a large multiplier—such as 175, the
multiplier in Faricy 128—will be considered an “adjustment” when typical
multipliers are in the single digits. 129
Further, clients may argue, and courts will consider, whether the fee is
excessive. 130 Although there may be results that justify high rewards, it is
unlikely that results will be the sole factor considered when calculating
quantum meruit values. Therefore, an attorney will have to ensure that the
contractual agreement is clear. Since fee agreements are contracts,
traditional contract defenses of mistake, fraud, or unconscionability may be
raised. 131 In preparing the contingency fee contract, there are likely many
aspects to consider and balance to avoid a fee dispute after the attorney is
discharged.
The following discussion provides attorneys with potential options for
forming contingency fee arrangements that avoid fee disputes in light of the
eight factors from Faricy.

3. The Eight Factors
a. Time and Labor Required
This factor would contribute positively to the client and negatively to
the attorney by limiting the quantum meruit value, 132 especially in a case like
Faricy where minimal time and labor were required. 133 However, recording

See Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 655, 656 n.2. Faricy believed it deserved a third of the $21.5
million recovery, and the district court thought $41,000 was the reasonable value. Id. To
arrive at a third of $21.5 million, assuming $41,000 was a lodestar value calculated by the
trial court, the court would have to apply a multiplier of 175 for the enhancement ((1/3) ×
21.5 million)/41,000 ≈ 175). Id. Courts may use a multiplier to adjust the lodestar amount
upward or downward in cases where the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or high. Milner
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 624 (Minn. 2008).
See Klaiber, supra note 47.
Thomton, Sperry & Jensen v. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(“By adopting the jury’s finding of excessiveness and reducing the award . . . , the court
exercised its proper responsibility. We find no abuse of discretion in that exercise.”).
Continental Casualty Co. v. Knowlton, 305 Minn. 201, 208–09, 232 N.W.2d 789, 794
(1975) (“The essentials of an express fee contract for legal services are the same as for any
other contract of employment and are governed by the ordinary rules of contract law.”
(quoting Holt v. Swenson, 252 Minn. 510, 514, 90 N.W.2d 724, 728 (1958))).
On remand from the supreme court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, “[T]his
factor militated against a substantial fee award . . . .” Faricy Law Firm, PA v. API, Inc., No.
A19-0846, 2019 WL 6461323, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2019).
Oral Argument of Faricy Law Firm, P.A. at 10:42, Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc.
Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn. 2018), http://www.mncourts.gov/
SupremeCourt/OralArgumentWebcasts/ArgumentDetail.aspx?vid=1178
[https://perma.
cc/8RRQ-FSQW] (Faricy’s attorney stating that less than ten hours were spent on the case).
128

129
130

131

132

133
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the work completed may assist attorneys in proving the accuracy of the
evidence used to support the other factors. 134

b. Nature and Difficulty of the Responsibility Assumed
This factor is likely to have limited impact because the nature and
difficulty of the responsibilities will function as modifiers that are unlikely to
drastically alter the fee assessment. Further, the difficulty of the
responsibility will likely be reflected in the time and labor required (the first
factor), the amount involved (the third factor), and the experience and
ability of the attorney (the fifth factor).

c. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained
The amount involved and results obtained should be the key factors
that the attorney focuses on to avoid a fee dispute when discharged before
the contingency. The amount involved can be shown through the exchanges
between the attorney, client, and opposing party, which are likely evidenced
in the briefs submitted to the court. Multiple, significantly different values
could appear throughout the course of the case, 135 and so, the values should
be appropriately documented.
The results obtained are a complicated matter because the attorney is
discharged before the final results of the case are known. Thus, there is a
need to be able to capture incremental results as the case progresses. Results
produced by the attorney may be shown through the achievement of
milestones in the case. The professional field of project management
defines a “milestone” as a significant point or event in a project. 136 A
“project” is an endeavor undertaken to create a unique result with the end
reached when the project’s objectives have been achieved or when the
project is terminated. 137 A project may also be terminated if the client wishes
to terminate the project. 138 Based on these definitions and descriptions, a
legal case has similarities to a project, and project management tools may be
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 662–63 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion took issue
with Faricy not providing the hours spent on the specific case for API Trust and would have
denied Faricy any fees.
In Faricy v. API Trust, potential claim and settlement values ranged between eleven million
dollars and fifty million dollars. See Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at *13 (“Proof of claim
mentions that ‘API estimates that the total value of such claims asserted in the Proof of Claim
exceed $50,000,000.’”); see also Respondent’s Brief at 39, Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API,
Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr. Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr.,
2017 WL 1832415 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017) (No. A16-1539), 2017 WL 7660556, at
*39 (“11 million dollar settlement offer that the Trust received while it employed Faricy as
its counsel.”) [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
PROJECT MGMT. INST., A GUIDE TO THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT BODY OF KNOWLEDGE
153 (5th ed. 2013).
Id. at 3.
134

135

136

137
138

Id.
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helpful in evaluating the attorney’s results. Accordingly, milestones could be
a valid tool when defining points within the attorney-client relationship to
trigger determination of a future payment amount. 139
The parameters for milestones should be tailored to each case. In an
insurance settlement case, such as Faricy, each settlement proposal or offer
may be seen as a milestone. The use of milestones could assist with
quantifying the work performed and results achieved, enabling the showing
of a specific completion rate, justification for fees, or substantial completion
of the work required. 140 Alternatively, the attorney could show that she or he
was prevented from achieving the milestones. 141

d. Fees Customarily Charged for Similar Legal Services
The attorney may be able to justify the fee for the service provided by
referencing fees charged in similar cases for other clients. The attorney
should be prepared to justify the fee for the service provided if there is a
known discrepancy between what the attorney is charging and other public
information (e.g., websites, attorney rates for those with insurance, or
information from bar associations). 142

e. Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Counsel
Together with the previous three factors, this factor contributes to
calculating or justifying the attorney’s hourly fee. The attorney may consider
compiling evidence that would justify the hourly rate, including the years of
experience, specific case history, lack of sanctions, or community activity
For example, Nevada’s sample contingent fee agreement form increases the contingent fee
percentage as the case progresses. Sample Contingent Fee Agreement Form, NEV. STATE
BAR,
https://www.nvbar.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sample%20Contingent%20Fee%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWP7-N6C4] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
See, e.g., Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C. 1983) (holding that an attorney
who enters into a contingency fee agreement with a client, substantially performs, and is then
prevented by the client from completing performance is entitled to the full amount specified
in the fee agreement and that quantum meruit the appropriate measure of damages only
when an attorney renders less than substantial performance); Morris v. City of Detroit, 472
N.W.2d 43, 48 (Mich. 1991) (awarding the discharged attorney the entire one-third
contingency fee because the attorney’s efforts were a significant factor in achieving the jury
verdict in the client’s favor and the attorney completed 99.44% of the services contemplated).
See Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) (“[The client’s]
refusal to cooperate in [the attorney’s] prosecution of the claim made it impossible for [the
attorney] to proceed further. In Texas, when the client, without good cause, discharges an
attorney before [the attorney] has completed [the] work, the attorney may recover on the
contract for the amount of [the] compensation.”).
Find a Lawyer, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.mnbar.org/member-directory/finda-lawyer [https://perma.cc/CWP7-N6C4] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (individual attorneys in
directory providing rate information).
139

140

141

142
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participation (among other information) before engaging in contingency fee
contracts. 143

f. Fee Arrangement Between Counsel and the Client
This factor is intended for the courts to understand whether the fee
arrangement is a contingent fee agreement. 144 The attorney should be able
to easily show this by producing the signed fee agreement. 145

g. Contributions of Others
This factor will interact with the third factor (the amount involved and
the results obtained) and will require understanding the progress of the case
to define key milestones and determine which attorney’s work allowed
specific milestones to be achieved. The terminated attorney will have to
justify how his or her work directly led to achieving the milestones.
Additionally, the court’s consideration of this factor means that an attorney
taking on contingency fee contracts would want to map out the entire
process of the case to be able to justify the contribution. 146

h. Timing of the Termination
For evidence on timing to meaningfully contribute to the court’s
application of this factor, it would be important to establish the date of the
initial contact with the client, the date of termination, and the earliest
possible date the case could have concluded. For cases where the attorney
begins strategy development upon initial contact, the date of initial contact
is likely more important than the date on which the contingency fee contract
was signed. The contingency fee contract date would likely function as a
backup in case no work was performed by the attorney for the client before
See, e.g., Charal v. Andes, 88 F.R.D. 265, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (recognizing the
contribution of high specialization in federal securities laws as well as the esoteric aspects of
accounting); Kenyon-Noble Lumber Co. v. Dependant Founds., Inc., 432 P.3d 133, 141
(Mont. 2018) (considering the attorney’s high standing in the profession, forty-plus years of
experience as a trial lawyer, and decades of nationwide and internationally teaching
experience). But see In re Estate of Smith, 131 A.D.2d 913, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(noting that the length of an attorney’s experience is not necessarily reflective of ability and
reputation).
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 660 (Minn.
2018).
See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(c) (2019) (“A contingent fee agreement shall be in a
writing signed by the client.”).
Id. r. 1.5(e) (2019) (providing that a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the
same firm is allowed only if: “(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by
each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client
agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is
confirmed in writing; and (3) the total fee is reasonable”).
143

144

145
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the contingency fee contract is signed. To avoid ambiguity regarding the
timeline, the attorney should document interactions with the client, as well
as any work performed between the initial contact and the formation of the
contingency fee contract.
With this approach, there is still the possibility that the attorney is fired
after constructing a complete legal strategy for the case in either an hourly
or a flat fee arrangement. This may be a risk that has to be assumed by the
attorney based on the arrangement for how the service is provided.

4. Additional Mitigation Strategies
In addition to the analysis of the eight factors provided in Faricy, there
are additional principles that can be considered to further adapt the
preparation and execution of contingency fee contracts to the eight factors.
The following analysis will consider freedom to contract 147 and
reasonableness of fees. 148 Since many factors could be included in the
attorney-client fee agreement and explained to the client, 149 it will be
necessary to consider unique circumstances to appropriately tailor the
agreement.

a. Freedom to Contract
The right to enter into a fee arrangement with an attorney is protected
by section 549.01 of the Minnesota Statutes, and the essentials of such
contracts are the same as any other contract. 150 Based on the freedom to
contract, the attorney should aim to craft a clear fee arrangement that is
understandable and acceptable to both parties and ensure that there is clear
evidence of mutual assent. 151
See Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976) (“[P]ublic
policy requires that freedom of contract remain inviolate except only in cases when the
particular contract violates some principle which is of even greater importance to the general
public.” (citing James Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 98 Minn. 22,
23, 107 N.W. 742, 742 (1906))).
See MINN. R. PROF CONDUCT 1.5(a) (2019). (“A lawyer shall not . . . collect an
unreasonable fee . . . .”). Additionally, “[e]xpenses for which the client will be charged must
be reasonable.” Id. r. 1.5 cmt. 1. “Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the
reasonableness standard . . . .” Id. cmt. 3.
See, e.g., Form No. 3, Sample Written Fee Agreement, Contingency Fee Agreement, CAL.
STATE
BAR
(Feb.
1,
2019),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/publicComment/2019/Sample-FeeAgreement-Forms-for-Public-Comment-(03-15-19).pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9YS-XT6J]
(recommending and detailing items to include in attorneys’ fee agreements).
Continental Casualty Co. v. Knowlton, 305 Minn. 201, 211, 232 N.W.2d 789, 796 (1975)
(quoting Holt v. Swenson, 252 Minn. 510, 90 N.W. 2d 724 (1958)).
See Benedict v. Pfunder, 183 Minn. 396, 400, 237 N.W. 2, 4 (1931) (“Not mutual assent
but a manifestation indicating such assent is what the law requires.” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1932))); State v. Bucholz, 169 Minn. 226, 227,
147

148

149

150

151
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When entering an attorney-client relationship, it may be helpful for the
attorney to explain the nature of the contingency fee arrangement to the
client, including the idea that each party is taking a financial risk
corresponding to the workload required and the potential outcome of the
case. 152 Additionally, it may be beneficial for the attorney to explain that
dismissing the attorney does not absolve the client from paying the necessary
fees because an attorney dismissed without cause is still entitled to
compensation. 153
After dismissal, a client seeking to mitigate liability for attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit may relate the specific circumstances of the
attorney’s representation to relevant factors that may lessen the value of the
attorney’s services, including the quantity of the service, quality of the
service, and the results achieved. 154 In a situation where excellent results were

210 N.W. 1006, 1006 (1926) (“The main element of the contract-making process is the
mutual assent of the parties.”).
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 19. A graphical representation, such as the one below, may
assist with explaining to clients the risks taken by attorneys and clients in contingency fee
arrangements.
152

As the graph suggests, clients and attorneys are more likely to consider the payment
acceptable when the payment under the contingency fee arrangement is approximately the
same as what it would have been under hourly rates (Type I). Type II demonstrates clients’
potential loss of savings that could arise if services were performed under an hourly fee
arrangement. Type III demonstrates a situation where an attorney assumes the risk by
miscalculating the time necessary for a case.
See Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 657
(Minn. 2018). If Google search result counts are considered as any indication of general
interest, there is more than twice as much interest in discharging an attorney than hiring an
attorney, with a search for how to hire a lawyer (or similar terminology) returning
approximately 100 million results and how to fire one returning over 200 million results.
The Google search was conducted on October 11, 2019. Explaining this background may
reduce the awkwardness inherent in discussing discharge provisions during the formation
stage of the contractual attorney-client relationship.
Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action by Attorney to Recover Fees on Quantum Meruit Basis,
in 16 CAUSES OF ACTION 85 (Dec. 2019 update).
153

154
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obtained with minimal effort—or effort perceived as minimal, 155 perhaps due
to the high quality of the attorney’s service or lack of complexity of the case—
the client’s argument concerning fees will likely be focused on the quality or
quantity of the service.
The number of hours spent on the case is likely the most
straightforward and common approach for disputing the quantity of
service. 156 Hours spent on a case is the starting point for the lodestar
method 157 and is also the first factor represented in Faricy. 158 Courts also
recommend keeping records of time spent. 159 Given the dissenting opinion
in Faricy, it is likely important to be able to prove the hours spent on the
specific case in contingency fee contract work. 160 Justice Gildea’s dissent
pointed out that the district court could not determine whether the
information on the hours, as provided by Faricy, were indeed spent on the
claim. 161 Moreover, Faricy did not contend or prove that the hours submitted
were a representative estimate of the time and labor spent on the claim. 162
The majority opinion did not address the issue of the amount of evidence
required because it chose to remand the matter to the district court. 163
However, the record of hours will be insufficient or inappropriate to
justify the contingent fee when the work required in hours is
disproportionately small compared to the results achieved or the value
received from the attorney’s work. When the effort required could
potentially be minimal, 164 perhaps due to experience in similar litigation or
ample likelihood of recovery, an alternative measure may be required for a
mutually agreeable contract between the attorney and the client as a basis
for recovering the fee the attorney believes is justified after dismissal.

Respondent’s Brief, supra note 135, at 2 (“Appellant performed minimal work on the
Home Liquidator claim.”).
See Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 656 (“[T]he lack of evidence of the hours that Faricy had
worked stymied the district court’s efforts.”).
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. (“The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence
supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is
inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.”). “A district judge may not,
in my view, authorize the payment of attorney’s fees unless the attorney involved has
established by clear and convincing evidence the time and effort claimed and shown that the
time expended was necessary to achieve the results obtained.” Id. at 440–41 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
See Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 662 (Gildea, J., dissenting) (stating that the record supports the
district court’s determination that “Faricy failed to carry its burden of proving the reasonable
value of its work”).
155

156

157
158
159

160

161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at 32–33.
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One method to show quantity may be the duration of representation
for the case. 165 This measure will be straightforward if the attorney can show
to the client that there is consistent, albeit quantitatively minimal, work being
performed during the duration of the attorney-client contract. Periodic
updates from attorneys may reassure the client that there is work being done
and justify the duration presented as an appropriate measure of work
performed before discharge.
It may be tempting for an attorney to rely on the outcome of the case
and let the result speak for itself in the contingency arrangement, where
additional communication with the client may be seen as unnecessary time
spent on the case. However, it is good practice to maintain
communication. 166 It will establish to the client that there is ongoing work
performed, and it will also likely result in client satisfaction, contributing to
a lasting attorney-client relationship through the fulfilment of the
contingency.
In Faricy, the attorney represented the client in a one-third contingency
fee arrangement from January 2009 to August 2012 (forty-three months),
with the settlement made nearly three months after termination in
November 2012. 167 Applying a duration-based calculation to Faricy, an
attorney’s fee of 25.6% may be justified. 168
Therefore, a suggested term in the contract may be:
If the attorney is discharged without cause by the client, the fee
payable by the client to the attorney will be calculated by
multiplying the settlement amount by a duration factor
considering the duration of representation. The duration factor
will be calculated by dividing the time between the beginning of
the representation and termination of representation by the time
between the beginning of the representation and when the final
settlement amount is proposed. 169
Explicit mention of this calculation in the contract is important because
even if district courts can now consider the contingent fee agreement based
Duration may be a factor similar to the eighth factor, “timing of termination,” as described
in Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658.
See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 4 (2019) (requiring lawyers to “maintain
communication with a client concerning the representation”). Specifically, a lawyer should
keep a client informed about the status of the case, reasonably consult with the client
regarding the client’s goals and objectives, and provide sufficient information to the client as
necessary to allow the client to make decisions regarding the client’s matter. Id. r. 1.4.
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 655.
The contingency fee multiplied by the duration factor would be (1/3) × (43/46) ≈ 25.6%.
165

166

167
168

See id.
This term allows a linear calculation of the fee based on the eighth factor from Faricy
(timing of the termination) by decoupling it from the seventh factor (contribution of others).
See id. at 660. Decoupling these factors reduces the complexity of the fee calculation. The
author does not intend to assume any credit or liability due to the use of the proposed
language.
169
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on the sixth factor from Faricy, the attorney is not automatically entitled to
the full contingent fee. This is because a discharged contingent fee attorney
may not recover the contingent fee as a remedy for breach of contract under
Minnesota law. 170
As discussed previously for the third factor (results), quantity may also
be proven through the milestones achieved in the case. 171 In a case involving
a settlement, it may be beneficial to adjust the floor value as a basis for
compensation once settlement discussions progress to ensure there is a fair
relationship between the outcome of the case and the payment the attorney
receives. 172 The contract could be written in a manner that updates the floor
value as the base for calculating the contingency fee. 173 The floor value used
for the calculation will increase or decrease based on the attorney’s work
during the life of the contingency contract, with the latest floor value
representing the new baseline as long as there is no inappropriate client
intervention. The last updated value during the contingency fee agreement
170
171

See id. at 661.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.3.c.

This model is inspired by stock trading orders, which are placed in a manner that secures
gains or limits losses by using set prices to execute trades where prices fluctuate. See, e.g.,
Investor Bulletin: Understanding Order Types, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 12, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_ordertypes
[https://perma.cc/WYU4-6R2N] (describing different stock trading order types).
The illustrations below depict different scenarios where the floor value is adjusted
throughout settlement negotiations:
172

173
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will be used as the baseline for calculation of quantum meruit after discharge
of the attorney. Additionally, if the settlement amount increases based on
the attorney’s performance under the contingency agreement, there should
be a provision to ensure the work by the attorney is reflected. Likewise,
decreases in the settlement amount due to errors by the client or the work
of subsequent attorney(s) should be ignored. The scarcity of caselaw
supporting a contingency fee calculation based on a tentative settlement
offer 174 highlights the importance of setting a floor value as a basis for
compensation.
Further, the duration factor and the floor value could be combined to
calculate the appropriate amount of quantum meruit compensation for the
attorney. The suggested language to add to the contract may be:
If the attorney is discharged without cause by the client, the fee
payable by the client to the attorney will be determined by
multiplying: (1) the last settlement value offered by the opposing
party while the attorney represented the client, or the final
settlement the client received from the matter in which the
attorney represented the client, whichever is higher, unless the
increase cannot be attributed to the attorney; (2) the contingency
fee percentage; and (3) the duration factor. The client agrees that
any communication between the client and the opposing party
without the attorney during the time the attorney is representing
the client that leads to a lower settlement amount will not lower
the first value used in this determination. 175
Nonetheless, if the attorney sees a significant risk of a decrease in the potential
award after discharge, it would be prudent to inform the client of such potential
outcome.
Another possible method of determining the quantity of work is to
identify the legal theories that enabled the successful outcome. In Faricy,
See Faricy Law Firm, PA v. API, Inc., No. A19-0846, 2019 WL 6461323, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2019) (“Faricy [did] not cite[] to any caselaw supporting its argument that a
discharged attorney is entitled to a contingent fee of a tentative settlement offer.”).
See, e.g., Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (citations
omitted) (explaining how “Arkansas allows recovery of the stipulated contingent fee
computed upon the amount ultimately realized by the client, less the expenses which the
discharged attorney would have been required to make in performing the unperformed
portion of the contract,” and Wisconsin attorneys are “allowed to sue for damages on the
contingent fee contract based upon the amount of the settlement or judgment ultimately
realized by the client, less a fair allowance for services and expenses which would have been
expended by the discharged attorney in performing the balance of the contract”). The
suggested inclusion of the contingency fee percentage and the duration factors in the
proposed language accompanying this footnote respectively reflect the sixth and eighth
factors of Faricy. Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658. Multiplication of the factors makes calculating
the fee simpler than it is under a case-by-case, multi-factor analysis. However, it could be
difficult to prove the potential settlement value without settlement offers. See Ruzicka v.
Rothenberg, 83 F.3d 1033, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996).
174

175
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the successful settlement between API Trust and Home Liquidator hinged
on the understanding of the insurance policy’s aggregate limits of coverage. 176
Even though arriving at such an understanding may seem easy in hindsight,
the attorney’s ability to focus on the key information of the case to identify
the legal theories should be recognized before evaluating the quantity of
work and the attorney’s contribution. In Faricy, the court documents
suggested that the attorneys shared the theory of the case with their client,
and the client understood it . 177 Thus, the identification and development of
the legal theories that led to the successful outcome could be an additional
and significant milestone that determines a different contingency percentage
on its own. 178
To recognize the importance of developing a theory of the case, an
attorney may include the following language in the contingency fee contract:
The attorney will develop the legal strategy (“Theory of the
Case”) as part of the service to the client. This is a key activity of
the legal representation, and completion of strategy development
and initiation of the execution of the strategy that contributes
positively to the client’s case entitles the attorney to __% and __%
of client’s recovery, respectively, regardless of whether the
attorney represents the client through the contingency. 179
Finally, avoiding dismissal by maintaining a positive attorney-client
relationship would help ensure that the contractual relationship survives
until the contingency is met.

b. Reasonableness
It is clear from case law, 180 the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct, 181 and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 182 that
reasonableness is a limiting factor on the amount of recovery for the attorney
Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at 5. (“API’s insurers refused to pay . . . claiming that their
aggregate limits were exhausted. Faricy advised API to dispute the insurers’ assertions of
exhaustion as their policies had no aggregate limits. That central issue has proved crucial to
all of API’s insurance recoveries over the years.”)
Faricy shared the strategy with API Trust via a draft memo. Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22,
at 11.
See NEV. STATE BAR, supra note 139.
The wording is modeled after the Nevada Sample Contingent Fee Agreement Form. See
176

177

178
179

id.
See In re Petition for Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees, 870 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. 2015)

180

(citing Burns v. Stewart, 290 Minn. 289, 301, 188 N.W.2d 760, 767 (1971)) (“[T]he attorney,
who had performed substantial services under the contingent-fee agreement and was
terminated by the client before funds were recovered, was entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services.”).
MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a) (2019) (“A lawyer shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”).
MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). This model rule has the
same language as MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a).
181

182
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discharged from a contingency fee. Further, there is an expectation in the
legal profession that “the fee charged by a lawyer should be reasonable from
an objective point of view.” 183 One way to show this is through clear and
unambiguous language in the contract, which shows that both parties
understood the fee agreement contract as providing a reasonable fee under
quantum meruit if the attorney were to be discharged. 184
In reviewing Faricy, it may be fair to question whether API Trust would
have brought the lawsuit against Faricy if the settlement and contingency fee
were lower. 185 Additionally, API Trust may not have sued Faricy if Faricy
had a full-time team of attorneys working on the case. 186 These observations
raise the question of whether the attorney and the client shared a mutual
understanding of the value of the attorney’s service.
To avoid such misunderstandings and miscommunication, it may be
helpful to clearly describe the fee arrangements to ensure a mutual
understanding of the value of the attorney’s services. 187 Value could be

AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 19.
When the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, courts enforce the parties’
agreement as expressed in the language of the contract. Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781
N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010). Clear language could also thwart the potential contract
defense of misrepresentation.
However, if API Trust sought Faricy’s representation based on a recommendation from
one of Faricy’s clients and knew about the $2.3 billion settlement, it is plausible that API
Trust also expected a high settlement value. See Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at 4–5. There
may have been an altogether different lawsuit if the settlement value was lower than API
Trust expected, with API Trust potentially questioning Faricy’s competency.
As an example, if the case genuinely required Faricy to assign a team of ten attorneys, each
billing $100 per hour, for 2,000 hours per year for three years, the initial calculation based
on the lodestar method would indicate $6 million as the reasonable compensation (10 × 100
(dollars/hour) × 2,000 (hours/year) × 3 (years) = $6,000,000).
The illustrations below show the costs and savings based on contingency fee arrangement
and outcome. If the attorney had to spend many hours, yet the recovery was low (left figure),
the client would have savings under a contingency fee arrangement. If the client entered a
contingency fee arrangement, and the attorney had to spend minimal hours to recover a high
amount (right figure), the attorney’s fee would be higher than that under an hourly fee
arrangement.
183
184

185

186
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explained as the significance or monetary worth of the services. 188 In a
contractual sense, the service promised by the attorney would be the
consideration, bargained for and mutually agreed upon by the attorney and
the client. 189 Even then, the attorney must be able to defend against
traditional breach of contract lawsuits by demonstrating that the fee for the
attorney’s services are reasonable when compared to the value of the
services.
Where the attorney is without fault and discharged from a contingency
fee contract, the attorney may demonstrate the reasonableness of the fees in
a few different ways. The first is to use a graduated scale of percentages of
the total amount ultimately recovered. 190 However, this method would only
be an indirect basis for determining the contingent fee when the attorney
has been discharged. Then, documenting the completion of each step by
recording the explicit agreement on the completion of steps would assist
with memorializing the mutual agreement of the milestones. As each
contingency fee rate is established, the contract language should state that
the recovery is only being delayed until the contingency is met, regardless of
whether the attorney is discharged before the contingency is met. This
would ensure that both parties agree that a fee percentage has been cleared
based on the work completed.
Another way to show value may be to explicitly state a maximum
potential fee in the initial contingent fee contract, with the option to revise
this amount after sufficient research has been conducted. 191 This way, the
client would have notice of the maximum potential recovery fee, thereby
agreeing to the representation only on the understanding that the fee under
the contingency contract is reasonable. 192 To avoid client disputes, the
188

Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

Continental Casualty Co. v. Knowlton, 305 Minn. 201, 208–09, 232 N.W.2d 789, 794
(1975) (“The essentials of an express fee contract for legal services are the same as for any
other contract of employment and are governed by the ordinary rules of contract law.”
(quoting Holt v. Swenson, 252 Minn. 510, 514, 90 N.W.2d 724, 728 (1958))).
See CAL. STATE BAR, supra note 149; NEV. STATE BAR, supra note 139. Nevada’s and
California’s sample contingency fee agreement forms provide examples of a graduated scale
of percentages at different stages of a case’s progress. The Nevada form provides specific
percentage examples that increase as the case progresses (25% before filing a complaint,
33⅓% before trial is commenced, 40% during or immediately after the first trial or
settlement, and 45% on appeal or with further action). NEV. STATE BAR, supra note 139.
The California form provides blank areas to insert percentages based on progress of the case.
CAL. STATE BAR, supra note 149.
See Karcich v. Stuart (In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc., Sec. Litig.), 194 F.R.D. 166, 175 (E.D.
Pa. 2000) (including the potential maximum request for attorneys’ fees in a class action
settlement notice).
For example, in Faricy, the maximum recovery could have been between $40–50 million,
based on the total claim. Faricy’s Brief, supra note 22, at 13, 25 (“API estimates that the total
value of such claims asserted in the Proof of Claim exceed $50,000,000.”) (“Faricy proposed
a settlement demand in ‘the near 40 million dollar range.’”).
189

190

191

192
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contract should also clarify that the amount presented is to be used only to
communicate the potential maximum fee, rather than the upward potential
of the recoverable amount. 193 Such communication may be reflected in the
initial fee agreement or in subsequent attorney-client communications. An
example of such contractual language could be:
For the purpose of communicating the potential maximum fee
the client may be paying the attorney, the initial assessment of the
case suggests that there could be a potential for recovering
$__________. Multiplied by the contingency rate described in
the fee agreement, the fee payable to the attorney by the client
has the potential to be $___________. The client agrees that this
fee is reasonable and reflects the value the attorney will provide
to the client through the attorney’s work. This assessment is to
present fee information to the client and does not constitute an
estimate, promise, or guarantee of recovery amount.
This language should give the client an opportunity to consider
whether the contingency fee agreement is the best approach for the client,
as opposed to a flat-fee or an hourly-rate contract. When the client agrees
to this clause, it will show that the client understands the value of the
attorney’s services and the potential fee, regardless of the time that will be
spent by the attorney on the case.

5. Future Implications of the Faricy v. API Trust Decision
To predict the future implications of the Faricy decision, an
examination of cases connected to Faricy may help understand how the
contingency fee arrangement has been weighted as a factor in quantum
meruit calculations in the past. This section discusses the negative
implications of increased complexity of fee agreements and the need for
attorneys to reconsider the financial risk of contingent fee agreements as a
result of the Faricy decision.
The eight factors used in Faricy can be traced back to Ashford and
Kittler. 194 The factor relating to the existing fee arrangement likely has the
See generally Janie Mershon, 5 Tips for Managing Client Expectations (When Legal
Outcomes Don’t Come with Guarantees), ARAG NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
193

https://www.araglegal.com/attorneys/learning-center/topics/delivering-great-clientservice/how-to-manage-client-expectations-when-legal-outcomes-arent-guaranteed
[https://perma.cc/E3ZB-SWB2] (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
The following table compares the factors from the three cases:
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. Kittler v. Sheehan Props., Ashford v. Interstate
API,
Inc.
Asbestos Inc., 295 Minn. 232, 236– Trucking Corp. of Am.,
Settlement Trust, 912 37, 203 N.W.2d 835, 839 524 N.W.2d 500, 503
N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. (1973)
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
2018)
(1) time and labor required (1) time and labor required
(1) length of time each
firm spent on the case

194
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most significance under the Faricy framework. Although the fee
arrangement discussed in Kittler pertained to a particular financial
arrangement, giving partial interest in a property as fee payment, 195 Kittler
cites State by Head v. Paulson as the authority supporting consideration of
the existing fee arrangement between counsel and the client. 196 Faricy noted
that the fee agreement “is merely one factor, among a host of others that the
district court is to consider in awarding reasonable attorney fees.” 197 Faricy
treating the fee agreement as merely one factor among many may be
concerning for attorneys engaging in contingency fee contracts because such
treatment of the fee agreement could negate the financial risk attorneys take
by opting for a contingency fee. Additionally, because Paulson did not
consider the contingent fee arrangement to be the most controlling factor,
the contingent fee arrangement is unlikely to receive primary consideration
when determining the amount of quantum meruit recovery by the
attorney. 198
The impact of the Faricy decision may be limited for contingency fee
cases where the hours and effort required by the attorney to reach the
recovery or settlement are proportionate to the fee amount because the
attorney’s effort and the client’s expectation would be commensurate. 199
(2) nature and difficulty of
the responsibility assumed

(2) nature and difficulty of
the proposition involved

(3) amount involved and the
results obtained

(3) magnitude of
principal amount

(4) fees customarily charged
for similar legal services

(4) results obtained

(5) experience, reputation,
and ability of counsel

(5) fees customarily charged
for similar services

(6) fee arrangement existing
between counsel and the
client

(6) experience, character,
reputation, and ability of
counsel

(7) contributions of others
(8) timing of the termination

(7) fee arrangements

(2) result of each firm’s
efforts

the

Kittler, 295 Minn. at 234, 203 N.W.2d at 838 (“[A]n arrangement giving plaintiffs a
25-percent interest in the ranch for forbearance in demanding immediate payment for
services and expenses.”).
Id. at 839 (citing State by Head v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426
(1971)).
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 660 (quoting Green v. BMW of North America, LLC, 826 N.W.2d
530, 538 (Minn. 2013)).
Paulson, 290 Minn. at 374, 188 N.W.2d at 426 (“[T]he court properly did not regard the
contingent fee arrangement as the most controlling factor . . . but considered it along with all
other relevant factors . . . in determining the value of the legal services.”).
See supra note 152 and accompanying text. This situation will fall in the Type I zone of
the chart in supra note 152.
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However, there may be a more significant implication for cases that require
minimal hours or effort—where the theory of the case plays a larger role in
determining the outcome—because the client’s payment to the attorney may
seem disproportionately large and unjustified to the client. 200
In the latter set of cases requiring minimal hours or effort, the
contingency arrangement could receive less weight because the nature of the
fee arrangement may be outweighed by other factors. Moreover, the trial
court’s discretion to restrict the fee to what the court considers reasonable
and conscionable may override the pre-recovery, bargained-for
understanding of a successful legal strategy between the attorney and the
client. The Faricy decision could have positive implications for clients
because district courts will be able to limit the fee payable to a discharged
attorney by considering the hours spent by the attorney. 201 Faricy also has
the potential to lower the cost of the original litigation by allowing the client
to opt for the financially prudent manner of legal representation. 202 By
requiring further clarity to ensure mutual assent, clients can benefit from
clear communication about their legal journey.
Despite these potential positive implications for clients, there may be
more serious negative implications. 203 First, the fee agreement for contingent
fee agreements may become more complex to ensure the attorney can
receive payments based on the contractual agreement rather than quantum
meruit if the attorney is discharged before the contingency is met. 204 This
200
201

See Type II in supra note 152.b
Faricy, 912 N.W.2d at 658 (requiring district courts to use the time spent by the attorney

to determine the quantum meruit value of a discharged, contingent fee attorney’s services).
This projection is hypothesized based on the potential for improved attorney-client
communication and the client’s understanding of the cost implication of contingency fee
arrangements, which would aid the client’s decision in selecting the fee arrangement that has
a higher potential to be more beneficial to the client.
For general concerns, see William D. Hunter, Limiting the Wrongfully Discharged
Attorney’s Recovery to Quantum Meruit—Fracasse v. Brent, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 791
(1973) (considering the demand for higher retainer fees, the reluctance to enter into
contingent fee contracts, the increased incentive for third persons to interfere in the attorneyclient contract, the decreased incentive for attorneys to work diligently on behalf of clients
who they suspect may discharge them, and the attempts to circumvent the quantum meruit
limitation as potential undesirable effects of Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972), which
adopted quantum meruit for recovery by discharged attorneys).
An attorney discharged from a contingent fee agreement is entitled to prompt payment for
the reasonable value of services performed based on quantum meruit. Trenti, Saxhaug,
Berger, Roche, Stephenson, Richards & Aluni, Ltd. v. Nartnik, 439 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989). However, the impact of the attorney’s services on the final outcome of the
case may be uncertain until the occurrence of the contingency. Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So.
2d 1089, 1094 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979). Additionally, delaying the quantum meruit action until
the occurrence of the contingency could risk recovery being barred by the statute of
limitations in jurisdictions that have adopted the rule that the cause of action accrues
immediately upon discharge. Id. n.6. If the recovery under quantum meruit is uncertain,
relying on contractual agreements could reduce the uncertainty.
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could lead to more fee litigation because it is unlikely that the client will
voluntarily pay the previous attorney when the client likely had a reason for
discharging the attorney.
Second, attorneys would have to rebalance their calculation of the
financial risk involved in entering a contingent fee agreement. The risk is
often justified by the potentially large payout. However, if the client can
discharge the attorney shortly before the contingency occurs, and quantum
meruit places limited emphasis on the contingent nature of the fee
arrangement, the attorney assumes an additional risk of discharge that would
require a reconsideration of the previous financial risk calculation. 205 If the
quantum meruit calculation will limit the fee to what would have been
obtained under an hourly fee arrangement (even when the attorney achieves
excellent results), the attorney would essentially be financing a legal action
for the client. This is because the practical effect would simply be a delayed
payment of an hourly fee. This could cause the contingent fee attorney to
require a higher payment from the client due to the added uncertainty or
altogether discourage attorneys from entering into contingent fee contracts.
The legal community may have to wait for another case to reach the
Minnesota Supreme Court before understanding whether the time and
labor required will dominate the analysis, as in the lodestar method. 206
Additionally, further instruction from the court will likely be necessary to
determine how much weight should be given to the contingent nature of the
fee arrangement. 207 It may be helpful for attorneys to prepare strong
This risk is also noted in Hunter, supra note 203, at 791 (citing Tracy v. MacIntyre, 84
P.2d 526, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938)). There may be further uncertainty with when the fee can
be obtained if the attorney is discharged sooner because the potential fee amount remains
uncertain until the result is determined. See In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963)
(“There can be no doubt of the right of a client to discharge [the] lawyer, whether [the lawyer
is] employed on a quantum meruit basis or for a contingent fee. In such event, if the lawyer
has a contingent contract and is without fault, [the lawyer] has the election to claim a
reasonable fee for the work done, as upon a mutual rescission, or to wait until the claim is
liquidated by judgment or settlement and then sue (if necessary) for [the] contract fee.”).
Although the fee awarded by the court of appeals on remand ($84,000) can be considered
substantial based on the hours expended by Faricy (up to ten hours) and the highest hourly
rate ($465), this amount pales in comparison to the amount that is one-third of the eventual
settlement received by API Trust (~$7,166,666, i.e. a third of $21.5 million). See Faricy Law
Firm, PA v. API, Inc., No. A19-0846, 2019 WL 6461323, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
2019). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, on remand, interpreted the Faricy decision to
require consideration of “all of the factors and weigh them together to determine the
reasonable value of an attorney’s services.” Id. at *4.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, on remand, noted that the supreme court’s holding did
not elevate the eighth factor (termination timing) above all the other factors. Id. at *4. On
remand, the court of appeals found that the supreme court “instructed district courts to
consider all of the factors and weigh them together to determine the reasonable value of an
attorney’s services,” without specifying the weight of any of the eight factors. Id. Additionally,
the court of appeals did not find the district court’s existing-fee-arrangement analysis—that a
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arguments that justify weighing case results more heavily when excellent
results are achieved with minimal effort. 208
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s eight-factor test in Faricy clarified
what factors should be considered when calculating the quantum meruit
value of services provided by a terminated contingency fee attorney. 209 By
providing the eight-factor test, the court also addressed how to establish fees
in difficult cases with multiple service providers and potential fee
recipients. 210
This case note analyzed potential methods for addressing the eight
factors provided in Faricy. Additional analysis considered the principles of
freedom of contract and reasonableness to further mitigate litigation
concerning the compensation of contingency fee attorneys who, without
fault, are involuntarily discharged by clients before the contingency occurs.
However, uncertainty remains for trial courts due to the lack of clarity
on how to weigh the eight factors presented in Faricy. The outcome of cases
will depend not only on the facts of the cases but also on how the factfinders
apply the Faricy test and what they consider to be reasonable fees.

fee award greater than ten times the highest customary hourly rate is unreasonable—to be
erroneous. Id. at *3.
For a potential argument, see Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“It must be kept in mind, however, that the amount of recovery rather than
the time spent is the prime factor in fixing [the] fee. . . . Expertise in a field of law should be
rewarded rather than be used as the basis for fee reduction.”).
Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn.
2018).
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